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Abstract 
 
Financial Innovation: cause or consequence? 
The recent financial crisis and subsequent investigation into to its causes leads many to 
propose that the primary suspect of instability is financial innovation itself.  This paper 
introduces an alternative perspective that relates the perennially changing nature of financial 
innovation to the location of its emergence along the ‘technology shift’.  Financial 
innovation has the potential to be both useful and/or detrimental to the real economy.  
According to delineations of the technology shift derived from long term aggregate time-
series – during the years1929-2007 the emergence of those innovations largely useful to the 
real economy primarily happened within the transformation phase of the long cycle.  
Conversely, those of questionable merit are primarily found throughout three of the four 
sub-periods under analysis.   
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The Gathering 
For the past year or so an ongoing debate has been coursing throughout all of the social echelons of 
the United States.  It is taking place in hair salons and front porches, as well as boardrooms, back offices, 
and the halls of academia.  The latest juicy details are splashed across the front pages of newspapers 
nationwide with regularity.  Moreover, the events that caused this collective discourse to take place are also 
imbuing outrage, and accordingly, the American public is demanding an explanation as well as the timely 
identification and capture of the wrongdoers.  The subsequent investigation has exposed a vast and 
previously unknown realm where it appears as if greed and corruption ran rampant; and, it is beginning to 
look as if formerly unassailable heads will indeed actually roll.  The topic on the tip of everyone’s tongues 
is of course, the current financial crisis we have been forced to watch unfold before our very eyes. 
 “How did things come to this?  What happened and who is responsible for this ever growing mess?” 
the public is demanding to know.  Analysts, advisors, academics, consultants, political pundits, and anyone 
with platform big enough to stand on (digital and/or nationally syndicated soapboxes work best) are hard at 
work promoting their ideas on who exactly the guilty parties are and what kind of solutions will get us out 
of the nightmare we find ourselves in because of them.  Explanations as to the primary origins of our 
financial downfall vary, and as a natural consequence, so too do the recommended solutions.  The variance, 
however, is slowly coalescing into debates of upon whose shoulders the most amount of guilt should be 
laid.  The primary suspects are now largely known:  the public’s eyes and ears have been set awash with 
tales of ‘exotic financial instruments’; the greedy kingpins of the investment world who used and abused 
them; the corrupt ratings agencies that turned a blind eye towards them; and enervated regulatory bodies 
who lacked the will to put a check on their unbridled use.  The only question that seemingly remains is 
who, or what, is the most guilty with regard to our financial ruin.  
 The answer to that question for a growing amount of people seems to be financial innovation itself.  
The fact that financial innovation - in the form of the previously mentioned exotic instruments - played a 
key role in the whole process is undoubted, and its reputation in the minds of many is taking a beating 
because of it.  More often than not these days, one finds the term couched in quotation marks.  Thus when a 
reader sees the phrase - “financial innovation” - they are encouraged to view the entire category as suspect, 
and revoke the positive connation usually associated with the term ‘innovation’.  For example, economic 
pundit Barry Ritholz tells his viewers and readers that “financial innovation is just another word for 
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excessive and reckless leverage”.1  This is an extreme way to put it - but then again that is what pundits do 
best, right?  Yet however extreme, it also manages to capture exactly how a growing portion of the public 
feels.  A more nuanced phrase that carries essentially the same derogatory message is the term ‘financial 
engineer’.  Today’s financial engineer is the descendant of FDR’s ‘bankster’, and popular sentiment carries 
the same loathing for both.  
 Albeit with a less vitriolic tone, there are many within the economic branch of academia also 
expressing skepticism with regard towards financial innovation.  Dani Rodrick, a professor of international 
political economy at Harvard University recently issued a challenge to the advocates of financial 
innovation, explaining that they owed the rest of us “a bit more detail about the demonstrable benefits of 
financial innovation…some of the ways in which financial innovation has made our lives measurably and 
unambiguously better.”2   A more neutral stance is taken by Peter Tufano (2002, pp. 31-31) in a chapter on 
financial innovation written for The Handbook of the Economics of Finance.  In it he explains that while 
most scholars in the field agree that financial innovation “has both positive and negative impacts on 
society, their conclusions regarding the net impact of financial innovation” on society are quite varied.  
 However, Tufano (2002, pp. 2-3) also teaches us that “financial innovation has been a critical and 
persistent part of the economic landscape over the past few centuries”, reminding us that from a long-term 
perspective “innovation ebbs and flows and…the Schumpeterian process of innovation – in this instance 
financial innovation – is a regular ongoing part of a profit maximizing economy”.  William Poole, the 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis echoes this sentiment but with rather less neutrality.  In 
his 2008 article entitled Financial Innovation: Engine of Growth or Source of Instability3 he attempts to 
exonerate financial innovation by reminding us along with Tufano that “financial innovations have 
occurred throughout recorded history”, adding the caveat that “we should not forget the importance of 
financial innovation in promoting economic growth”.  Interestingly, he too teaches us that “financial 
innovation, like innovation in other industries, is part of the [Schumpeterian] process of ‘creative 
destruction’ that drives market economies forward and raises living standards”, conclusively opining that 
“we should not fear financial innovation”.  
                                                           
1 http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/2008/09/regulatory-exem.html 
2 http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2008/09/nows-the-time-to-sing-the-praises-of-financial-innovation.html 
3 http://www.stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2008/03_06_08.html 
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 Creative destruction and the boom and bust pattern of the business cycle, as well as the related 
financial crises that appear with cyclic regularity have long been topics of interest to economists and 
economic historians.  Joseph Schumpeter taught us about the business cycle and the process of creative 
destruction.  Later on his student, Hyman Minsky, gave us the ‘financial instability hypothesis’.  In it 
Minsky (1992, p. 7-9) explains that “like all entrepreneurs in a capitalist economy, bankers are aware that 
innovation assures profits” - thus these “merchants of debt…strive to innovate in the assets they acquire 
and the liabilities they market”.  The general notion Minsky then posits is that “over periods of prolonged 
prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations 
that make for an unstable system.”  In other words, over time economies consistently make the transition 
from financially ‘robust’ to financially ‘fragile’ in a predictable and cyclic fashion. 
      Finally, Lennart Schön – also influenced by Schumpeter, provides us with the highly compatible 
‘technological shift thesis’4.  In his 1998 article, Industrial Crises in a Model of Long Cycles: Sweden in an 
International Perspective, Schön (pp. 398-399) provides us with a long-run view of economic growth, 
explaining that under the auspices of a capitalist system, a society’s economic growth is inextricably 
intertwined with cyclical “changes in long term or structural conditions”, and that these cycles are 
connected to the ‘technological regime’ of particular general purpose technologies (GPTs).  Broadly 
speaking, Schön (1998, p. 399) teaches us that there are three primary phases of this long cycle: ‘crisis’, 
‘transformation’, and ‘rationalization’ – and that the nature of economic growth changes from one phase to 
the next.  He contends that the ‘shifts’ from transformation to rationalization occur habitually ‘within a long 
structural cycle of approximately 40 years’, where 25 years are spent in transformation, and the remaining 
15 in rationalization.  Crises form the bridge from one phase to the other, as well as from one technological 
regime to the next, and are a time of intense ‘creative destruction’. Fascinatingly, he also explains that these 
cyclic structural shifts bring with them “shifts in behavior…in the economy and society” as well.                  
History shows us that financial innovation can indeed be a tremendous positive force for economic 
growth.  Yet it is also true that the instruments derived from it sometimes lead to disastrous results, causing 
serious harm to society and the real economy.  Moreover, Schumpeter, Minsky, Schön, Tufano, Poole, and 
many others all agree that innovation – including financial innovation - is cyclical in nature.  The research 
question duly proposed then, is this: Can the technological shift thesis explain the changing nature of 
financial innovation in the U.S.?   Using the taxonomies of both Minsky and Schön, it is expected to be 
                                                           
4
 Along with Schumpeter and in the same tradition, Schön’s ideas are also heavily influenced by Swedish economist Erik 
Dahmén’s (1950, 1988) work on development blocks.  
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shown that the transition to ‘fragile finance’ happens during the later stages of the rationalization phase.  It 
is at this point that dubious innovations are the most likely to arise from mounting pressures to maintain 
profit margins, possibly precipitating and amplifying the destabilizing effects of the next crises phase. 
Conversely, it is expected to be found that financial innovations occurring during the transformation phase 
assist in the expansion of a new development block - thus, they are largely beneficial to ‘real’ economic 
growth, and generally have a positive impact on society.5   
In his 2008 article, The Human Foundations of Financial Risk, Alex Pollock explains that the 
process the American public has gone through in the past year that is detailed in the first paragraphs of this 
paper is a classic case of ‘post-bust’ behavior. “In the wake of a bust, there is always a predictable series of 
political activities: first, the search for the guilty; second, the fall of previously esteemed heroes; and third, 
legislation and increased regulation to ensure that ‘this will never happen again’.  But with time it always 
does happen again.”  He goes on to pose the question: “Could universal knowledge of financial history 
among financial actors change the recurring bubble and bust behavior?”  And goes on to answer: “Perhaps 
it could, but the project is utopian.”   
Requesting universal knowledge of financial history among financial actors is perhaps a tad bit 
utopian.  What is not utopian however – what is absolutely practical and essential in fact – is that we 
continue expanding our common stock of knowledge with regard to innovation, growth and the financial 
industry.  Furthermore, although research into economic cycles and financial innovation has occurred 
throughout the better part of the twentieth century, rarely have the two been fused together.  Indeed, 
according to Tufano (2002, p. 37) “the subject of financial innovation remains one in which our intellectual 
maps show vast uncharted – and potentially interesting - lands to be explored”.  This researcher hopes to 
make a useful addition to that exploration with this inquiry. 
II. 
 Before we go any further, an outline of the direction and pace of the paper will prove useful.  To 
start off, a broad based discussion of the literature contained within the fields of financial innovation and 
the technology shift respectively occurs in section two, progressing into a more detailed discourse centered 
upon the ideas of both Lennart Schön (1989, 1998) and Carlotta Perez (2002, 2007), and followed up by an 
                                                           
5 However, there may be linkages found with the development of ‘bubbles’ within the new technology industries.  Nevertheless, 
Schön’s thesis allows for their correction through the process of creative destruction during the ‘short crisis’ that links together 
the transformation and rationalization phases.   
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introduction to some of their key concepts.  Section three comprises the essence of this paper.  First, it 
provides us with the origins of the data gathered as well as an explanation of the applied method of 
investigation.  It then moves on to a presentation of the quantitative data gathered with regard to detecting 
the presence of the technology shift in the US, and then again with respect to the qualitative data gathered 
on financial innovations – ultimately providing us with an integrated rendering of both, as well as a detailed 
analysis of the models’ implications.  Lastly, section four offers some concluding remarks as well as a bit 
of discussion.  
A drink before dinner 
Financial innovation is most certainly a key feature of a dynamic capitalist economy - and as such, 
it is quite surprising to discover that the field suffers from a relative dearth of research.  For example, 
Tufano (2002, pp. 3) describes the existing body of work as ‘fairly modest in scope’, while Scott Frame and 
Lawrence White (2004, pp. 1-2) explain that in their quest to ‘scour the financial literature landscape’, they 
found that despite the field’s possession of a ‘broad descriptive literature’, only twenty four articles were 
concerned with empirically testing ‘hypotheses concerning financial innovation’.  Tufano goes on to tell us 
that most of this relatively small body of existing literature is spread between six sub-fields: neo-classical 
interpretations of the role of financial innovation; hypotheses on the reasons behind its occurrence; analyses 
of the laws and policies of ‘tax rules, regulation and innovation’; ‘studies of financial innovation in the 
industrial organization literature’; studies of individual innovations; and the ‘handful’ of empirical studies 
previously mentioned.  Cross-cutting themes of these studies include: the difficulties of taxonomical work 
(Graham & Dodd, 1934; Finnerty, 1988, 1992, 2001; Bank for International Settlements, 1986, Tufano, 
2002; Battilossi, 2000); the role regulation plays in creating incentives for innovation (Miller, 1986; Kane 
1986); and the role of the technological advances in telecommunications (White, 1996, 1997; Frame & 
White, 2009).   
A small but growing neo-classically rooted literature on the ‘finance-growth nexus’ also deserves 
mention.  A number of these papers (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Acemoglu and Zillibotti, 1997; Saint-
Paul, 1992) focus on the effects financial intermediaries have on the rate of productivity, while Yuan Chou 
and Martin Chin (2004) attempt to construct a model that captures the effects of financial innovation on 
macro-economic growth.  John Persons and Vincent Warther come closer to this paper’s contention that 
both the timing of creation, as well as the changing nature of financial innovation is characteristically 
cyclical with their 1997 article, The boom and bust patterns in the adoption of financial innovation.  
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However, their focus remains tied to investigating the rate of adoption of specific innovations by firms - 
rather than examining the nature of the innovations being adopted.   
Conversely, research on the technology shift hypothesis (Schön, 1998; Lundquist, Olander & 
Svensson-Henning, 2007a 2007b) has overwhelmingly tended to focus on the real economy and the 
manufacturing industry in particular.  With the exception of Schön’s 40 page booklet written in 1989 on the 
history and evolution of Sweden’s Debt Office, entitled From war economy to State debt policy6 - very 
little research on the relationship between technology shifts and the financial industry has been conducted.  
Instead, their efforts have rather been concentrated on discovering what effects the shift has upon long-term 
growth, regional development and social welfare.  However, as Lundquist, Olander and Svensson-Henning 
explain in their 2007 article entitled Decomposing the technology shift: Evidence from the Swedish 
Manufacturing Sector, there is a related school of thought that is also working on the ‘interdependence 
between technological development, and economic, institutional and social processes’.  They tell us that the 
ideas of those who subscribe to the ‘techno-economic paradigm approach’ go quite well ‘with the 
theoretical suggestions made by Schön on the diffusion of generic technologies, complementarities, and 
time bound characteristics of economic growth’.  The techno-economic paradigm approach also falls within 
the Schumpetarian camp, and one of its primary proponents, Carlota Perez, has spent much of her career 
developing a thesis concerning the cyclic and mutually dependent nature of technological and financial 
innovation.   
In her 2002 book, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and 
Golden Ages, and her 2007 article, Finance and technical change: A long-term view, Perez provides us 
with a dynamic model of structural change that emphasizes the roles of both innovative entrepreneurs and 
financiers in equal amounts.  She identifies two distinct overarching phases that occur during the ‘life 
cycle’ of a technological revolution - the ‘installation’ and ‘deployment’ periods – and in chapter 13 of her 
book, she proposes that the nature of financial innovations changes from phase to phase. 
Great Minds… 
Although the language used to describe the sequence of events is different between the two authors 
– with Perez taking a rather layman friendly approach and focusing more on political and social processes, 
                                                           
6
  The appendix contains what may be the first English printed presentation of Schön’s technology shift hypothesis.  Although 
the focus is primarily on the activities of the Debt Office – or more specifically, the logic behind its decisions of whether to 
pursue either an ‘expansive’ or ‘restrictive’ State debt policy, peripheral attention is paid to general changes in the behavior of 
Swedish finance during  the rationalization and transformation phases respectively.  
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whereas Schön speaks with the precision of an economic specialist - their characterizations of what goes on 
during the various phases of the life cycle of a technological regime are remarkably similar. Perez’s (2002, 
p. 36) distinction between the installation and deployment periods of a technological revolution is 
theoretically almost identical to Schön’s (1998, p.399) description of the transformation and rationalization 
periods of the technology shift.  In fact, it is important to note that what they are both describing, albeit in 
different ways and with some conflict in the details7, is the same general phenomenon.   
Both authors contend that what defines a technological regime is not simply one revolutionary 
innovation.  It is the innovation together with all the ‘complementarities’ derived from it that constitute a 
regime.  Perez (2007, p. 3-4) draws both from Burton Seely Keirstead’s (1948) notion of ‘constellations’ 
and Chris Freeman’s (1982) related notion of ‘new technology systems’ when she describes a technological 
revolution as a ‘cluster of technology systems’.  These clusters, she explains, provide both a ‘shared 
common sense model of best technical and organizational practice’ as well as ‘generic technologies that 
modernize the whole economic system’.  Similarly, Schön is indebted to Erik Dahmén’s (1950, 1988 p. 5) 
concept of ‘development blocks’ - defined as “a sequence of complementarities which by way of structural 
tensions…may result in a balanced situation”.  Furthermore, Lundquist, Olander and Svensson-Henning 
(2007, p. 146) go on to explain that  Schön  takes Dahmén’s contention one step further by positing that 
complementarities are ‘not just of technical, but also of institutional and organizational nature’ as well.  
Therefore, although Perez’s use of the label ‘techno-economic paradigm’ emphasizes the contents of the 
long cycle, whereas the phrase ‘technology shift’ highlights the transition between cycles, it is clear they 
are both describing and analyzing the same historical condition.  
Because the works of these two researchers complement each other greatly, this paper will draw 
from both of them, using the strengths of one author’s ideas where the other leaves gaps and vice versa.  
                                                           
7
 There are at least two points of conflict in Schön and Perez’ analyses that have the potential to ultimately work as wedges, 
enlarging the disparities between the two.  The first is that Schön (1998, p. 409) contends the  economy-wide burst of growth 
in the late transformation phase stems from a general increase in demand caused by the investments in the new tech. firms 
whereas Perez (2007, p. 17) argues that it is caused by the ‘hyperinflation of assets’ which work as an ‘invisible hand for 
massive credit creation’.  The second is their estimation of the timing of the transition between the transformation and 
rationalization phases, or installation and deployment, respectively.  Schön (1998, p. 400) proposes that the two are linked 
through a ‘short crisis’ whose origins lie in the effects of the ‘technological push’ caused by the arrival of a technological 
regime.  Conversely, Perez ( 2007, pp. 15-16) tells us that the ‘passage’ between the two phases can be ‘short or quite long’, 
going on to argue that the transition taking place in the first half of the twentieth century lasted from 1929-1943.  This 
difference largely stems from the fact that Schön and Perez are focusing on different aspects of the technology shift, with 
Schön investigating movements within the economic sphere proper and Perez concentrating on changes occurring within social 
and political institutions.  
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For instance, Schön (1998, pp. 401-402; p. 409) provides the means with which to discern the existence of 
a technology shift through ‘quantitative analysis of aggregated time series’, whereas Perez offers only 
qualitative evidence.  She does however, propose a new taxonomy of financial innovations, one which 
classifies them ‘according to their main purpose’ and ranks them from ‘most useful to the ‘real’ economy to 
the least useful’.  Even more, Perez (2002, pp. 138-141) posits that ‘each phase [of the techno-economic 
paradigm] has characteristics that will bring forth certain types of financial innovation’ – and because her 
periodization of the technology cycle matches so closely with Schön’s in theory, her proposed 
schematization of the timing of financial innovation will also be taken advantage of in subsequent sections.  
A Few Concepts 
Soon we will review and analyze the empirical evidence brought forth with regard to the question of 
whether or not the timing and nature of financial innovation changes in relation to the phases of the life-
cycle of a technological regime.  Before we go any further however, a few concepts should be more 
precisely defined, and the methods of data collection and analysis will also be outlined. 
According to Lundquist, Olander and Svensson-Henning (2007, p. 146), a technology shift can be 
summarily defined as the ‘launch and diffusion of new generic technologies with complementarities’.  
These generic technologies, or general purpose technologies (GPTs) are, according to Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995), ‘enabling technologies’ that create ‘new opportunities rather than offering complete, 
final solutions’.  Examples of GPTs include the steam engine, the railroad, electricity, the combustible 
engine, and the microprocessor.  Now, as every good ‘Intro to Microeconomics’ student learns and as 
Schön (1998, p. 398) reminds us - in order ‘to improve utilization of human resources to human needs’ we 
essentially have only two options – we either become more resource efficient, or we do ‘something new 
and different that better fits to resources and needs’.  These two different behaviors – either becoming more 
efficient, or breaking with the mold and trying something new – are the basic behaviors that characterize 
the rationalization and transformation periods of the technology shift respectively. 
More formally, Schön (1998, pp. 398-399) defines the transformation phase as “changes of 
industrial structures, where resources are reallocated between industries, and diffusion of basic innovations 
within industry… provides basis for such reallocation”.  Conversely, he defines the rationalization phase as 
“the concentration of resources to the most productive units within branches and measures to increase 
efficiency in the different lines of production”.   Schön (1998, p. 398-399) then posits that these temporal 
differences in behavior are apparent in several different identifiable trends, including the investment ratio 
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and the wage ratio8.  During the transformation phase, he explains that investment tends to be long term in 
character and has a ‘limited immediate effect’ on productivity.  Conversely, investments made during the 
rationalization phase are focused on increasing efficiency and therefore have a ‘more direct effect upon 
productivity, growth, and real income’. 
FIGURE 1. The Ratio of Investments to Value Added in Swedish Industry, 1850- 
1995. Fixed Prices with Annual and Five Year Moving Averages
 
Source: Schön, Lennart,Transformation and imbalance. Patterns in Swedish economic development. Stockholm 1994; Swedish 
National Accounts. 
 
Schön (1998, p. 400-401) explains that although Sweden’s investment ratio displays ‘the ordinary 
business cycle’ throughout the time period under analysis, there is also a ‘long-term cyclical pattern with 
low points in the early 1890s, early 1930s, and early 1980s’ that ‘coincide with international crises’.  
Moreover, following these crises are ‘periods of roughly 25-30 years with a rising investment ratio’, giving 
way to ‘15 years of falling ratio to the troughs in the years of crisis’.  To be sure, the investment ratio graph 
in figure one shows a pattern in line with the expected behavior of investment as outlined by the technology 
shift thesis.  
 
                                                           
8 He also confirms the presence of the technological shift by looking at labor productivity rates, the relationship between ‘the 
price of machinery and the price of industrial consumption goods’, as well as analyzing the timing of the reallocation of labor.  
However, this paper will focus primarily on the investment and wage ratios as supporting evidence. 
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FIGURE 2. The Wage Share in Swedish Industry, 1870-1995 
 
Source: Schön, Lennart,  (Stockholm 1994); National Accounts. 
 
The wage share ratio as displayed in figure two also corroborates the existence of the technology 
shift by highlighting the ‘alterations in income distribution’ between labor and capital.  As Schön (1998, p. 
410) points out, the ratio ‘shows significant fluctuations that correspond to both the 20- and the 40-year 
cycles’.  It is low when the expansion of the investment cycle begins and ‘culminates in the crises’.  
Additionally, its ‘level is considerably higher’ during the rationalization phase.  This second movement is 
also consistent with the notion that during the rationalization phase, firms rely more heavily on classical, or 
marginal, economic methods of raising or protecting their profit margin9.   
For her part, Perez (2002, pg. 47) further refines the characterizations of the two halves of the long 
cycle by identifying two distinct sub-periods within each phase.  The irruption phase occurs just after the 
introduction of the new cycle.  It is a time when new technologies and their complementarities are 
beginning to show ‘their future potential and make powerful inroads in a world still basically shaped by the 
                                                           
9
 Hence the infamous battle between labor and capital over ‘surplus value’ most likely has its roots in the rationalization 
phase of the technology shift.   
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previous paradigm’.  She identifies the latter half of the transformation period as the frenzy phase – the time 
when an ‘intense build-up of the new infrastructure and new technologies’ takes place.   
However, she also contends that this is a period when ‘structural tensions in the system’ begin to 
flourish, eventually coming to a head, and thus bringing the ‘frenzied’ pace of development to halt.  The 
tensions are ultimately brought to resolution during what she terms the ‘turning point’ between the two 
halves of the technological cycle.  She posits that turning points are typified by recessions that ‘follow the 
collapse of a financial bubble’ and are the point at which ‘the required regulatory changes are made to 
facilitate and shape the period of deployment’.  Although her description of both the cause and content of 
the turning point differs somewhat from Schön’s (1998, pp. 400, 408), this point in the cycle can 
nevertheless be considered as the theoretical equivalent to his assertion that crises stemming from a 
‘technological push’ are the events that link together the transformation and rationalization periods.     
The two sub-periods comprising the second half of the technology shift are labeled by Perez (2002, 
p. 47) as the synergy and maturity phases respectively.  During the synergy phase, ‘all conditions are 
favorable to production’ and the new ‘technological paradigm is clearly predominant’.  The fourth and final 
sub-period of the structural cycle, the maturity phase, is characterized by the introduction of the last 
complementarities, while ‘dwindling investment opportunities and stagnating markets’ begin to occur ‘in 
the main industries of the revolution’10 within the core economies. 
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 The methodology used in Lundquist, Olander, and Svensson-Henning’s 2007 paper Creative destruction and economic 
welfare in Swedish regions: Spatial dimensions of structural change, growth and employment explicitly addresses the changing 
nature of industrial activity during the various phases of the technology shift and applies a quite useful theoretical stylization 
that is similar to, but more in depth than Perez’s characterization. 
 FIGURE 3. Recurring phases of each great surge in the core countries
Source: Perez, 2002. Technical Revolutions and Financial Ca
To this Perez (2002, pp. 71-72; 
the nature of financial innovation changes from sub
first address her distinction between finance capital
category ‘refers to the actual capital, but rather to their agents and purposes’.  In both instances, ‘the term 
‘capital’ is used to embody the motives and cri
function in the process of wealth creation’.  Thus, the financial capital category includes those agents 
‘whose purpose remains tied to having wealth in the form of money (liquid or quasi
grow’.  In other words, it is those intermediaries who fulfill ‘the function of making money from money’.  
Conversely, those agents falling under the category of production capital include those ‘who generate new 
wealth by producing goods or performing services (including transport, trade, or other enabling services)’.
Perez goes on to remind us that “by analytical definition these agents do this with borrowed money from 
financial capital…their purpose as production capital is to produce in 
                                                          
11
 Please forgive the poor quality of this illustration.  It is included in only order to show the movements of the four sub
periods. The illegible text is merely a summary description of the behaviors typified by each period 
up for the readers in previous paragraphs.  The label for the Y
revolution”.  The X-axis is ‘Time’.  
pital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages
138) adds yet another layer of sophistication when she posits that
-period to sub-period.  To understand why, we must 
 and production capital.  As she explains, neither 
teria’ that cause particular agents to ‘perform a particular 
-liquid)
order to be able to produce more”.
– which has
-axis should read: “degree of diffusion of the technological 
15 
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 and making it 
  
 
-
 been summed 
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In addition, she also makes the argument that economic growth during the transformation phase of 
the cycle is primarily driven by finance capital, while growth occurring during the rationalization phase 
comes from the hand of production capital12.  Generally speaking, the logic behind this contention is that 
the carriers of the new GPT are typically young, inexperienced and underfunded firms who need the 
backing of an experienced, savvy financier in order to successfully bring their product to market.  
Conversely, the rationalization phase is a time when those selfsame ‘upstart’ firms are now the bedrock of 
the current technological regime.  The logic of the market turns away from cultivating ‘game-changing’ 
technologies and begins to focus on productivity gains from increased efficiency – which naturally falls to 
the expertise of the (now) experienced agents of production capital.   
Because of this changing ‘lead and follow’ relationship between financial and production capital 
during the two phases, the ‘direction and intensity of innovation in the financial sphere itself’ is also 
‘profoundly affected’.  Consequently, Perez (2002, pp. 138-140) goes on to proffer a both a new typology 
of financial innovation – one that allegedly captures the difference between those innovations that ‘provide 
the life-blood for entrepreneurship and production’ and those that ‘take blood out of the [real] economy 
through manipulating paper wealth’ – as well as a model demonstrating how the changing disposition of 
financial innovation moves in rhythm with the technological shift.  
  
TABLE1. A tentative typology of financial innovations. 
 Type and Purpose of Financial Innovations  
A.  Instruments to provide capital for 
new products or services 
*For radical innovations (bank loans, venture capital 
and others) 
*To enable large investments and/or spread risks (joint 
stocks, bank syndicates and so on) 
*To accommodate the financial requirements of new 
infrastructures (for both construction and operation) 
*To facilitate investment or trade in novel goods or 
services 
B.  Instruments to help growth or 
expansion 
*For incremental innovations or production expansion 
(like bonds) 
*To facilitate government funding in certain 
circumstances (war, colonial conquest, infrastructural 
investment, welfare spending) 
*For moving (or creating) production capacity abroad 
                                                           
12
 See chapter 7 section B, The changing relationship between financial and production capital, in her book for an excellent 
discussion detailing the logic behind this suggestion. 
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C. Modernization of the financial 
services themselves 
* Incorporation of new technologies (communications 
and transport, security, printing, and so on) 
* Development of better forms of organization and 
services to clients (from telegraph transfers, through 
personal checking accounts and high street banking to 
automatic tellers and E-banking) 
*Introduction of new financial instruments or methods 
(from checks to virtual money, local, national, and 
international services, and various types of loans and 
mortgages) 
D. Profit-taking and spreading 
investment and risk 
Instruments to attract small investors (various forms of 
mutual funds, certificates of deposit, bonds, IPOs, ‘junk 
bonds’) 
*New instruments to encourage and facilitate big risk-
taking (derivatives, hedge funds, and similar) 
E. Instruments to refinance 
obligations or mobilize assets 
*To reschedule debts or restructure existing 
obligations (re-engineering, Brady Bonds, swaps, and 
others) 
*To buy active production assets (acquisitions, 
incorporations, mergers, take- overs, and junk bonds) 
*To acquire and mobilize ‘rent’-type assets (real-
estate, valuables , futures and similar) 
F. Questionable Innovations *Discovering and taking advantage of legal loopholes 
(fiscal havens, off the record deals and so on) 
*Discovering and taking advantage of incomplete 
information: ‘making money from money’ (foreign 
exchange arbitrage, leads and lags and similar) 
*Making money without money (from pyramid 
schemes to insider trading and outright swindles) 
Source: Carlota Perez 2002. Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages 
(p.139) 
Perez (2002, p. 140) teaches us that financial innovations of type A and B are the most useful to 
growth and production in the real economy.  They are associated with the ‘role of finance as an 
intermediary’ and work ‘either to initiate activities (A) or for growth, expansion, and extension (B)’.  Type 
C innovations work to ‘improve the performance of the financial world itself’, while innovations of type D 
are characterized by Perez as ‘a form of marketing for financial services’ which also eases the way for 
increased ‘profit – taking of the original creditors’.  Type E innovations work as ‘channels for change of 
ownership’13, and lastly, innovations of the type F variety are defined as ‘the various manipulative practices 
                                                           
13
  In his book, The Theory of Business Enterprise, Thorstein Veblen provides an excellent discussion concerning the detrimental 
effects caused by disturbances of ownership within the industrial system, positing that they can cause serious damage to the 
productivity of the real economy while simultaneously being the greatest source of ‘pecuniary gain’ to the financial sphere – 
thus highlighting a serious conflict of interests between the forces of production capital and financial capital respectively.   
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– mainly legal, though often illegitimate -…most of which tend to be social undesirable but not easily 
curtailed’. 
TABLE 2. The shifting behavior of financial capital from phase to phase of each surge 
Phase Prevalent Types of Innovations 
A     B     C     D     E     F 
Prevalent Characteristics of 
Finance During the Phase 
Irruption •     •     •     •     •     • Maximum intensity of real 
financial innovation 
Frenzy                                  •     •     •      Escape control, attract funds, 
speculate, inflate assets 
Synergy            •     •     • Adaptive innovations to 
accompany growth 
Maturity                   •                    •     • Accompany outspreading, 
escape control and manipulate 
Source: Perez, 2002 p. 141 
 Table two displays Perez’s hypothesis with regard towards the changing nature of financial 
innovations.  It is interesting to note that her expectations differ slightly from the expectations outlined in 
the introduction to this paper.  In part, this is because her proposal hinges upon the delineation between 
financial capital and production capital - and the transferal of dominance between the two during the 
transformation and rationalization phases respectively.  Interestingly, the main points of contention 
between the two proposals lay primarily within the frenzy stage, but also to some extent within the synergy 
phase as well.  As previously stated, this researcher expects that financial innovations proving most useful 
to the real economy will largely occur during the transformation phase, while those appearing in latter half 
of the rationalization phase will prove most harmful.  Perez however, infers that financial innovations 
occurring during the second half of the transformation phase are just as likely (if not more so) to wreak 
havoc on the economy than those appearing under the aegis of the maturity period.  Moreover, while no 
detailed expectations are held by this researcher with regard towards innovations occurring during the 
synergy phase, a general notion - following the logic of her hypothesis - is put forward that the innovations 
occurring during these years will in principle be characteristically un-useful to society and the real 
economy.  Naturally, this contrasts with Perez’s proposal that they will be characteristically useful. 
III. 
The Meal 
Because this research question is somewhat multidisciplinary in nature, the data gathered for 
empirical analysis is necessarily drawn from a variety of resources.  There are two rather disparate primary 
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elements that must be fused into one cohesive, analyzable, whole – and collation will involve several, 
oftentimes lengthy, steps.  Before that can be done however, data must be gathered on all fronts – including 
the collection of aggregate time series data on the technology shift, as well as, in Frame and White’s words, 
a scouring of the financial literature landscape, in search of financial innovations and their date of birth. 
 Quality ingredients, new recipe 
Although Perez (2002, pp. 60-62) makes the argument that attempts to test a long-wave hypothesis 
through the use of ‘long-term aggregate series’ are both ‘senseless’ and ‘a trap’, it is nevertheless this 
paper’s contention that aggregate time series can in fact be used as economic indicators of long term 
cyclical trends.  Schumpeter’s (1939, vol.1 pp. 43-44) suggestion that ‘aggregate figures conceal more than 
they reveal’ may indeed be correct – however, these figures are serving as ‘tips of the economic iceberg’.  
Thus, they should be valued for the services they are capable of providing rather than disparaged for those 
they cannot.  For metaphorical instance, those in the natural sciences do not denigrate the presence of 
erupting volcanoes or earthquakes for not explicitly explaining the movements of the tectonic plates…on 
the contrary, if it were not for their occasion, it would be much harder to discern the movements of the 
plates at all.  
To that end, aggregate data for the U.S. is collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 
and the wage and investment ratios duly figured in an attempt to reveal the movements of the technology 
shift.  Other sources for data on rates of annual investment and employee wages were investigated, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Historical Statistics of the United States for example, but ultimately the 
most reliable data for annual figures going back the farthest in time comes from the BEA - going back to 
1929 and extending through 2007.  Thus with these dates in mind, the first boundary line of the research is 
drawn.    
The task then turns to amassing a list of financial innovations occurring between the years 1929 – 
2007.  A massive overview of the financial innovation literature is conducted and an initial list composed 
of 97 innovations created14.    However, as Stefano Battilossi notes in his 2000 article entitled Financial 
innovation and the golden ages of international banking: 1890-1931 and 1958-1981, financial innovation 
is a ‘notoriously elusive and controversial concept’.  For instance, according to Tufano (2002, p. 4) some 
authors use the term to describe ‘shocks to the economy (i.e. monetary policy) as well as responses to these 
                                                           
14
 The primary sources include: Battilossi, 2000; Tufano, 1989 and 2002; Silber, 1983; Frame and White, 2004 and 2009; Miller, 
1986.   
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shocks’, while others ‘divide them into product or process innovations’ - thus setting aside newly 
introduced policy or regulations and solely focusing upon the response from the financial industry itself.   
With the exception of two items, ‘innovations’ in monetary or fiscal policy, or government 
regulations, are not emphasized in this paper.  However, the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FannieMae) are necessarily included 
because their introduction changed market behavior in very fundamental and long-lasting ways.  By 
guaranteeing the safety of up to $250,000 dollars in deposits made in member banks, the FDIC alone 
brought about an end to ‘runs’ on banks and bank panics in the United States.  Similarly, the creation of 
FannieMae in 1938 induced the birth of a whole new market, the secondary mortgage market - another 
event that changed the financial landscape of the country in incalculable ways.15   
Moving along, the next step in the process consists of creating a periodized list of the innovations 
according to the timing of their first appearances on the economic scene16.  This was the most arduous of 
tasks for two reasons: both because the ‘date of birth’ of financial innovations is rarely mentioned in the 
literature17; and because some ‘innovations’ of the twentieth century are merely reincarnations of older 
concepts.  The instruments falling under the latter category have been granted the title of ‘innovation’ either 
because they have been drastically ‘modernized’ by means of improved processes or new technology - or 
bans preventing their use have been lifted.  Altogether, the combined process of dating innovations and 
eliminating ‘double entries’ (i.e. products or processes with different names but very similar structure), 
ultimately trimmed the original list of 97 innovations down to 53 entries. 
Finally, these 53 innovations were then assigned to one of the six categories outlined by Perez’s 
(2002, p. 139) proposed typology, and according to their analytical characteristics18. 
                                                           
15
 Other important government policies are captured here by the instruments or bodies created in response to governmental 
action.  For instance, the contribution of the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation to the economy is encapsulated by its enduring 
innovation of the 20 year self amortizing mortgage.   
16
 Rather than dating observations by the timing of their first appearance, the alternative of dating them by the years of 
heaviest rates of use was considered, as this would have gone nicely with Schön and Perez’s emphasis on dispersion of 
innovations throughout the economy.  However, information of this sort is quite hard to come by and in most instances 
impossible to obtain because no such records are kept.   
17
 With the exception of a few infamous innovations such as the ATM machine and credit cards. 
18
 It is acknowledged that ascribing the innovations to categories based upon their applied characteristics rather than their 
analytical characteristics may alter the outcome of the analysis.  However, an accurate classification of the innovations 
according to applied characteristics would necessitate both the insight of an incredibly experienced financial specialist as well 
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TABLE 3. Classification of financial innovations 1929-200719. 
Type A B C D E F 
Innovation Venture 
Capital 
(1946) 
*FDIC 
insurance 
(1933) 
 
*Secondary 
Mortgage 
Market 
(1938) 
 
*Standby 
letters of 
credit 
(mid 
1960’s)
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*Note 
Issuance 
Facilities  
(1978) 
 
*Zero 
Coupon 
Bonds  
(1981) 
*Fixed rate, 
self-amortizing 
mortgage 
(1933) 
 
*Credit Card 
(1951) 
 
*ATM 
(1969) 
 
*Debit Card 
(1972) 
 
*Chicago 
Board Options 
Exchange 
(1973) 
 
*Point of Sale 
Terminals 
(1973/1974) 
 
*Automated 
Clearing 
Houses 
(1974) 
 
*IRA Accounts 
(1974) 
 
*Asset and 
liability 
*hedge funds 
(1949) 
 
*certificates 
of deposit 
(1961) 
 
*money 
market mutual 
funds 
(1971) 
 
*derivatives 
(1972) 
 
*Black-Scholes 
model 
(1973) 
 
*exchange 
traded options 
(1973) 
 
 
*bonds w/ put 
options or 
warrants 
(1977) 
 
*Special 
purpose 
vehicle  
(late 70s/early 
*repurchase 
agreements 
(1950) 
 
*leveraged 
buyout 
(1955) 
 
*floating rate 
notes (1970) 
 
*securitization- 
Mortgage 
backed 
securities 
(1970) 
 
*financial 
futures 
(1972) 
 
*management 
buyout (1974) 
 
*interest rate 
futures 
(1975) 
 
*junk bonds 
(1977) 
 
*contingent 
commitment 
*International 
Money 
Market 
(1972) 
 
*foreign 
currency 
futures 
(1972) 
 
*off balance 
sheet vehicles 
(late 70s/early 
80s) 
 
*structured 
investment 
vehicles 
(1988) 
 
*consumer 
home loan 
bundling 
(2002) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
as a heavy handed dose of subjective reasoning – the latter of which it is desirous to avoid.  Moreover, classification according 
to analytical characteristics is thought to be the more conservative of the two options - both extremes of the typology (A and F) 
are largely avoided - thus innovations that may fall under these respective categories using applied characteristics are shifted 
down only one type, to either B or E , leaving aggregate patterns still readily discernable. 
19
 The items in red are ‘reincarnated’ innovations.  That is, they are concepts or instruments that were either previously 
banned, or have been modernized or regulated to such an extent that they are considered to be new. 
20
 The five innovations lacking a specific year of ‘birth’ and instead dated with a range of years are still considered to be 
acceptable for use because the years given are within a very narrow range and manage to fall within a single phase of the 
technology shift. 
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management 
(1975) 
 
*NOW 
accounts 
(1981) 
 
*CHIPS (same 
day 
settlement) 
(1981) 
 
*Sweep 
accounts 
(early 80s) 
 
*Internet ASP 
(1994) 
 
*small 
business credit 
scoring 
(1995) 
 
*consumer 
online banking 
(2001) 
 
80s) 
 
*over-the-
counter 
derivatives 
(early 80s) 
 
*stripped 
bonds 
(1982) 
 
*consumer 
online stock 
trading (1995) 
banking 
(1979) 
 
*stock index 
futures 
(1982) 
 
*adjustable 
rate mortgages 
(1982) 
 
*options on 
indexes (1983) 
 
*municipal 
bond futures 
(1985) 
 
*collateralized 
debt 
obligations 
(1987) 
 
*sub-prime 
lending 
(1993) 
 
*credit default 
swaps (1997) 
 
Source: information on dates and characteristics found in Fung and Hsieh (1991); Kareken (1987); Chance (1998); Hayashi, 
Stuart and Weiner (2003); Cowan (2003); Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996); Greene and Wachter (2005); Abken (1994); Hester, 
Carron and Goldfeld (1981); Gompers and Lerner (2004); Cole, Browning and Schroeder (2003); Lowenstein (1985); Harrington 
(1992); Eun and Resnick (2000); Russell (2007); Miller (1986); Chang and Shanker (2006); Fisher, McKie and Mancke (1983); 
Mcmahon (2004); Purcell (2002); Mesler, VanDeventer, and Imai (2004); Twiford (1979); Chicago Board of Exchange; Slovin, 
Shushka and Hudson (1988); Kamery (2005); Silber (1983); The New York Times; Kerr (2008); Lucas, Goodman and Fabozzi 
(2006); Fuller and Collett (2008); Gerardi, Sharpiro and Willen (2007); Mester (1997); Tavakoli (2001) 
 Now the challenge turns towards fusing together the quantitative and qualitative evidence brought 
forth on the behalf of the technology shift and financial innovation respectively – into a unified picture of 
the movements of both.  
First Course:  
While Schön (1998, pp. 397; 401-409) uses evidence from Sweden’s manufacturing industry in 
order to examine the technological shift, the data presented here for the US is representative of the entire 
economy.   Schön explains that his use of the manufacturing sector as a lens stems from the fact that 
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generally speaking, this sector is characteristically highly driven by competition, particularly at the 
international level.  Hence, this is the industry that is typically affected first and foremost by the 
movements of the long cycle.  Therefore, isolating it from the rest of a national economy allows us to 
observe the development of the long cycle in relief.    Conversely, the view from the GDP level contains 
sectors that are affected by the shift differently at all the various points along its advance.  Therefore, the 
view we see from this highly aggregated perspective is necessarily less sharp around the edges.  
Furthermore, another difference that lends it weight towards more stable ratios over time with respect 
towards the evidence presented for the US, is the disparity between it and Sweden’s differing dependencies 
‘upon the world market’.  As Schön explains, Sweden is a ‘small and industrially specialized country’ and 
accordingly, it is ‘very sensitive to fluctuations in aggregate activity’.  While on the other hand, economic 
actors in the US cater to an extremely large domestic economy - the presence of which helps to soften the 
blow of volatile global forces.  Consequently, the ratios presented below are less dynamic and far more 
stable over time than the ratios Schön presents for the manufacturing industry in Sweden.  Nevertheless, 
they still contain evidence with regard towards the whereabouts of the technology shift in the US.    
FIGURE 4. The ratio of investments to value added in the US economy, 1929-2007. Current prices. 
 
Source: BEA. NIPA tables, data extracted March 7, 2009. 
 Although some may question the practice, the use of current prices in this long-term time series 
does not affect the relationship between investment and value added, and that is what we are interested in 
observing.  As discussed above, the most easily identifiable trend in the series is its stability over time, 
especially between the years 1950-1974, commonly referred to as the ‘golden era’ of economic growth.  
This time period can also be related to the rationalization phase of the technology shift, as the investment 
ratio shows a steady rate that declines rather sharply beginning around 1973.  In fact, with but one (rather 
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glaring) exception21, the lowest points of the investment ratio all correspond to periods of global financial 
fragility, thus not only corroborating Schön’s (1998, p. 401) contention that the technological shift 
possesses an international dimension, but also providing us with the turning points of the of the phases 
themselves. 
FIGURE 5.  The wage share in the US economy, 1929-2007. Current prices. 
 
Source: BEA NIPA tables, extracted May 15, 2009 
 If one judges from looks alone, the wage ratio does not appear as convincing as the investment ratio 
- but nevertheless, it does provide supporting evidence.  As previously mentioned, Schön (1998, p. 410) 
explains that the wage ratio highlights the ‘alteration in income distribution’ between labor and capital.  
Thus, generally speaking the wage ratio falls as the investment ratio rises and vice versa.  Theoretically this 
should give rise to a rhythm of highs in or around the beginning years of crises, low points during the years 
spent under transformation when the investment ratio is rising, and a higher but relatively more stable ratio 
during the years spent under rationalization.  The wage ratio as displayed in figure 2 above largely 
substantiates this.  The ratio peaks are particularly noticeable during the years 1932/1933 and 1946/1947.  
Less noticeable but still easily observable are the peaks that occur in 1971 and 1974, which are the 
beginning and ending years of the investment ratio crash, as well as markers of the beginning of the end of 
the golden era of growth.  The least obvious rises in the ratio happen in 1992 and 2001, but they are 
nevertheless, still apparent.  Altogether, these years of high wage ratios relate quite well with the years 
                                                           
21
 The extreme drop in private investment between 1941 and 1944 is attributable to the federal government’s involvement in 
the ‘wartime’ economy of those years.  The same type of occurrence is also responsible for the drop in the ratio from 1952-
1953, only this time the war had moved on to Korea.  Moreover, while the 1949 recession did not occur on a world wide scale, 
it was not just confined to the US.  A 1949 Federal Reserve ‘review of foreign developments’ reports that both France and 
Belgium suffered recession, and other countries were concerned with a down turn in their investments as well. 
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demarcating investment ratio lows, thus also providing us with a basis for identifying the technology shift 
in the US22. 
Second Course: 
 Now that the timing of the technology shift has been identified, we shall turn our attention towards 
an integrated presentation of it together with the periodized list of financial innovations that have been 
categorized according to Perez’s typology in order to see whether or not the nature of financial innovations 
changes according to its movements.  
TABLE 4.  Financial innovation and the technology shift in the US 1929-2007 
Phase A B C D E F 
Crises 
1929-1931 
      
Transformation 
1932-1949 
• •• • •   
Rationalization 
1950-1975 
 • •••••••• ••••• ••••••• •• 
Transformation 
1976-1991 
 •• ••• •••• ••••••• •• 
Rationalization 
1992-2007 
  ••• • •• • 
Source: Derived from Table 3 and Figure 4 
 Each one of the bullet points represents a financial innovation23.  Recalling that the order of 
innovation is ranked from A to F according to its usefulness to the real economy, we can clearly see both 
that there is indeed a pattern, as well as the fact that the number of innovations appearing from 1950-1991 
highly outnumber those occurring in the other time periods under analysis in either direction.  This skew in 
favor of the years 1950-1991 may have to do with an underlying bias in the data sources towards research 
on innovations occurring within these years; more likely though, is that this high number is related to the 
fact that an inordinate amount of innovating occurred within the financial sector during these years due to 
the break-down of the Bretton-Woods system, as well as to the appearance of a technological regime 
centered upon improvements in the spread of information and communication – two primary components 
of finance.  
                                                           
22
 The wage ratio peak occurring in 1983 corresponds to the investment ratio low of the same year and is related to Reagan’s 
monetary ‘shock policies’ of that era.  
23
 Just a reminder that the red asterisk’s represent ‘reincarnated innovations’. 
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 Nevertheless, the fact that a pattern is discernable is highly encouraging.  The innovations occurring 
during the transformation phase of the first technology shift are all largely beneficial to the real economy, 
whereas the years that take place during the two rationalization phases, 1950-1975 and 1992-2007 
respectively, see a dramatic increase in those less useful - even harmful - types of innovations.  These 
results appear to largely fall in line with the expectations outlined in the introduction to this paper – that 
innovations occurring during the transformation phase will be useful to the expansion of new development 
blocks, while on the other hand those occurring during the latter stages of the rationalization phase will 
prove to be largely detrimental.  Now the task turns to investigating the rationalization phase in closer 
detail.   
 
TABLE 5.  Financial innovation and the technology shift in the US 1929-2007, deconstructed 
rationalization phases using aggregate data as delineation indicators. 
Phase A B C D E F 
Crises 
1929-1931 
      
Transformation 
1932-1949 
• •• • •   
Rationalization  
1950-1960 
  •  ••  
Rationalization 
1961-1975 
 • ••••••• ••••• ••••• •• 
Transformation 
1976-1991 
 •• ••• •••• ••••••• •• 
Rationalization 
1992-2000 
  •• • ••  
Rationalization 
2001-2007 
  •   • 
Source: see Table 4 
 In this table we see the rationalization phases of the two technological shifts broken down into 
halves.  Rather than merely ‘chopping’ the phases in two and dividing equally, the timelines are 
demarcated according to trends contained within the investment ratio, and the years 1960/1961 and 
2000/2001 were accordingly chosen as breaking points.  Interestingly, the innovations occurring within the 
rationalization phase of the first technological shift overwhelmingly display the expected tendencies, 
whereas those appearing in that phase of the most recent cycle do not.  However, it is important to realize 
that it is only the time series that ends at 2007, not the rationalization phase - it is still possible for new 
innovations to occur.     
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These results are fairly encouraging, however it is impossible to ignore the fact that the observations 
appearing during the transformation period of 1976-1991 do not wholly conform to the expectation that 
during this part of the long cycle innovations are characteristically useful to the growth of the real 
economy.  In fact, both this phase and the (entire) rationalization phase appearing immediately prior to it 
are in possession of an equal total number of innovations classified in the D, E, and F categories.  Though 
not anticipated by this researcher’s expectations, this sort of behavior is in fact quite consistent with Perez’s 
supposition of what goes on during the first half of the transformation phase, the irruption period. 
 
TABLE 6. Financial innovation and the technology shift in the US 1929-2007 delineated by the four sub-
periods using aggregate data as indicators. 
Phase A B C D E F 
Irruption 
1931-1943 
 •• •    
Frenzy 
1943-1949 
•   •   
Synergy 
1950-1960 
  •  ••  
Maturity 
1961-1975 
 • ••••••• ••••• ••••• •• 
Irruption 
1976-1984 
 •• ••• •••• ••••• • 
Frenzy 
1985-1991 
    •• • 
Synergy 
1992-2000 
  •• • ••  
Maturity 
2001-2007 
  •   • 
Source: see Table 4 
 As previously mentioned, Perez (2002, pp.141-143) contends that innovations occurring during the 
irruption period will cover the spectrum in terms of usefulness to the real economy.  During the frenzy 
phase she asserts that innovations will tend to coalesce into those characteristically un-useful to the real 
economy, while the reverse is true for those born in the synergy stage.  And finally during maturity, she 
posits that the nature of innovations will tend towards either category B, or conversely – towards categories 
E and F.  The table above is delineated by these four sub-periods rather than the two overarching phases.  
Additionally, once again the timeline is demarcated according to trends within the investment ratio.   
While there is no immediate trend easily distinguishable, the behavior of the transformation phase 
1976-1991- split up here into its irruption and frenzy sub-periods, does appear to have become 
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understandable through the lens of Perez’s hypothesis.  Additionally, the last five sub-periods - ranging 
from ‘maturity 1961-1975’ through ‘maturity 2001-2007’ – broadly conform to her hypothesis, although 
there are several exceptions.  The first is rather minor, in that maturity phase 1960-1975 contains more 
items within the C and D categories than it does in the prescribed B, E and F classes - thus suggesting that 
more complementarities than her hypothesis calls for are still being introduced into the economy at this 
time.  The second issue however, is that the classifications of the innovations occurring during ‘synergy 
1992-2001’ are not convincing with regard to their positive effects on the real economy, relegated as they 
are to the C, D and E classes.24.  Finally, the innovations contained within the Frenzy 1943-1949 and 
Synergy 1950-1960 sub-periods are not very consistent at all with her argument.  Perhaps there are too few 
observations during this time to come to any solid conclusions, but there is one glaring example of an 
innovation falling under a theoretically completely improper category.  The sole inhabitant of category A, 
venture capital, happened to come about in 1946, a year under the aegis of the frenzy phase – a time when 
no innovations that work for the good of the productive capital are assumed to be created.  Moreover, the 
earlier synergy phase has the same problem as the latter one in that the innovations occurring during this 
time are theoretically supposed to be beneficial to the real economy - but in reality what we see created are 
repurchase agreements, credit cards, and leveraged buy-outs. 
In all fairness however, Perez’s concept of the four sub-periods of a technological regime is in this 
instance being used in conjunction with the method of looking for long-waves through the use of 
aggregated time-series – a practice that she utterly disagrees with herself.  To make amends and give her 
hypothesis the fullest benefit of the doubt possible within the parameters of this research project, a fourth 
table utilizing both Perez’s qualitatively determined timeline of the movements of the long cycle as well as 
her subsequently differing demarcation of the four sub-periods shall be drawn up25.  
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 Their real life counterparts are even less so.  The innovations occurring during these years were: internet ASP (i.e. “paypal”), 
small business credit scoring, and online banking – all falling under category C; the D ranked innovation was consumer online 
stock trading; while the two E ranked innovations were sub-prime lending and credit default swaps; the item assigned to the F 
class is consumer home loan ‘bundling’. 
25
 The variance between this researcher’s ascribed years to the various sup-periods and Perez’s are cumulatively not that 
different. Only the first and last two sub-sections differ to an unusual extent.   
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TABLE 7.  Financial innovation and the technology shift in the US, 1929-2007 using Perez’s suggested 
timeline and without regard to aggregate data.26 
Phase A B C D E F 
       
Turning 
point 
1929-1943 
 •• •    
Synergy 
1943-1959 
•  • • ••  
Maturity 
1960-1974 
 • •••••• ••••• •••• •• 
Irruption 
1971-1987 
 •• •••••••• •••••••• •••••••••• ••• 
Frenzy 
1987-2001 
  •• • ••• • 
Turning 
Point 
2001-2007 
  •   • 
Source: derived from Table 3 and Perez (2002, p. 57) 
 The results shown in table 7 above are a bit more in line with her expectations.  Although Perez 
does not posit what sorts of innovations are to be expected during the turning points, one supposes that they 
must be a combination of those occurring under the frenzy and synergy periods respectively, which is to 
say that any of the categories would be acceptable.  The maturity period still has too many items in the C 
and D categories to perfectly match up with her theory, however the frenzy period from 1987-2001 
certainly appears to be living up to Perez’s surmisal in what is essentially picture perfect fashion.  
Nevertheless - the innovations occurring under the synergy period are still brilliantly non-conformist for the 
most part.   
Third Course  
 Intriguingly, these results lead us to somewhat of an impasse.  However, before it is reached, we 
pass several points of interest.  Table 4 – displaying the technological shift periodized according to 
aggregate indicators and using the transformation and rationalization phases as place-holders - seems to 
partially substantiate the claim that the nature of financial innovations changes from phase to phase.  
Moreover, table 5 disaggregates the rationalization period and the results displayed appear to provide at 
least some preliminary, although inconclusive, evidence with regard towards the premise that it may indeed 
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  Due to the timing of sub-periods overlapping in some cases, the green bullet points indicate an innovation that was also 
present in the immediately previous sub-period. 
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be the latter part of the rationalization phase that the majority of the detrimental innovations first appear.  
However, the limited number of observations - especially in the 1992/2007 rationalization phase – 
precludes any concrete inferences from being made.  Another issue area lies with the 1976-1991 
transformation phase.  Unlike the same phase in the previous cycle that occurred from 1932-1949, this 
phase contains one innovation less in the A and B categories, and a staggering fourteen items ranked either 
D E or F, as compared to only one D type innovation in the previous cycle. 
 In an attempt to investigate this issue further, Perez’s hypothesis regarding the movements of 
financial innovation during four stylized sub-periods of the technology shift was applied to a periodization 
of the technology shift using aggregate data as indicators (table 6), as well as with her qualitatively derived 
timeline (table 7).  This different approach shows us that the observations appearing under the 
transformation phase 1976/1991 or 1971/2001 respectively (depending on which table is used), empirically 
corroborate Perez’s ideas with regard to the behavior of financial innovations during this part of the long 
cycle – and in contrast to the expectations outlined by this research paper.  However, innovations occurring 
during the synergy period (or periods, again depending on which table is used) were, in every instance save 
one27, blatantly nonconformist with regard to her expectation that they would prove useful to the real 
economy and production capital alike. 
 So where does this leave us? Or more specifically, where does this leave non-detrimental financial 
innovation?  Momentarily leaving aside the question of placement of innovations that imbue financial 
fragility - we have on the one hand, a hypothesis that looks for beneficial innovations to occur primarily in 
the transformation phase, while on the other there is Perez’s (2002, p. 141) suggestion that they will make 
appearances both in the first half of the transformation phase as well as throughout the entire rationalization 
period.  Tables 4, 5, and 6 all show that five out of the six total beneficial innovations fall within one of the 
transformation phases.  Conversely, table 7 largely substantiates Perez’s theoretical suggestions, placing 
one beneficial innovation in the 1943-1959 synergy phase, one in the 1960-1974 maturity phase (which are 
the theoretical halves of the rationalization phase), and two in the irruption period 1971-1987. The 
remaining two are located within the turning point 1929-43.  And thus, we arrive at the impasse. 
   It seems counter intuitive to accept both hypotheses as correct with regard to the timing and 
appearance of beneficial financial innovations if what they are each proffering fundamentally conflicts in 
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 The lone saving grace is found in table 7, where venture capital appears in column ‘A’ during the synergy phase. However 
taken altogether, this hardly overwhelming – especially considering that there were four other innovations of types C, D, and E 
also present. 
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the details.  Nevertheless, one possible solution is to simply accept that qualitatively and quantitatively 
derived delineations of the timing of the technology shift affect the logic behind the theoretical placement 
of the innovations within the long cycle differently.  For instance, it is interesting to note that while they 
both broadly agree with one another as to the assignment of years to phases of the technology shift, they 
strongly disagree with regard to the first years and the last years under study in this analysis.  Perez (2002, 
p. 57) contends that the years 1943-1959 make up the synergy period of the previous shift whereas Schön 
(1998, p. 403) asserts that those are years spent largely under the transformation phase28.  The same thing 
happens again from 1987-2001, with Perez maintaining that these years make up the frenzy period while 
Schön explains that the rationalization phase sets in around 1991.   
Yet another possible reason stems from the difference in emphasis the authors make between the 
cause, content, and repercussions of the two crisis periods.  Schön (1998) places relatively more weight on 
the structural changes that take place during the crisis that connects the end of one long cycle with the 
beginning of another whereas Perez (2002, p. 114-118) contends that the most important changes take place 
during the ‘turning point’ between the two halves of one technology shift.    
Nevertheless, the important task of taking stock of all the other lessons this research provides us 
with still remains.  Perhaps the most obvious of the remaining lessons - as well as the most unfortunate - is 
the realization that over a period of 78 years, and out of 53 financial innovations surveyed, only six are 
found to be characteristically beneficial to the growth of the real economy.  Another fifteen of the 
innovations are related to the ‘modernization of the financial services themselves’, and hence are neither 
inherently beneficial nor detrimental to the real economy – while eleven more are related to attracting small 
investors and/or ‘encouraging and facilitating big risk taking’ with investments made - thus introducing an 
element of speculation into the system.  Finally, according to Perez’s typology, twenty one of these 
innovations are directly related to increased financial fragility of the real economy.  If this spread between 
types of innovations is anywhere near typical - then it indicates that over time, the appearance of a financial 
innovation belonging to either category E or F is essentially three and half times more likely to occur than 
the occasion of one belonging to either class A or B!   
In addition, although the primary focus of this research is to study the appearance of financial 
innovations over multiple technology shifts, there is also something to be learned from analyzing the 
differences between the long cycles.  For instance, the distribution between types of financial innovation 
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 His results refer to the Swedish experience, while this paper looks at the US, hence the slight difference between this paper 
and Schön’s assessment of the ending and beginning of phases. 
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that we see presented in every table here shows us that four out of the six beneficial innovations made their 
appearance during the first technology shift under analysis.  In other words, the results of this research 
indicate that out of the 25 observations (or 27 using Perez’s timeline as seen in table 7) contained within the 
most recent long cycle, only two of them are characteristically beneficial to the real economy.  Even more, 
this trend does not just reflect decreasing beneficial innovation, but also a rise in the total number of 
innovations found in the E and F classes as well.  Table 4 shows us that even though it contains three 
observations less than the previous shift as a whole, during the most recent long cycle the total number of 
innovations ascribed to the two lowest ranked categories rose from nine to twelve items. 
This general shift in the character of innovations from one long cycle to the other is interesting for 
several reasons - and the most immediate question that springs to mind is “Why is it like this?”  The two 
most probable causes of this trend have already been cursorily mentioned in this paper once before.  The 
first is the nature of the undergirding GPT of the current technological regime, the microprocessor, and its 
relationship to the financial industry.  The revolution in the IT sector has brought about a corresponding 
revolution in both aptitude and behavior of finance.  The speed at which information, including price and 
credit information, can be processed has opened the floodgates with regard to new types of services as well 
as to financial innovation of a fragility imbuing nature.  The second most likely suspect is the return of high 
interest and volatile exchange rates.  Beginning around 1970 and quickly accelerating with the breakdown 
of the Bretton-Woods system circa 1971-1973, financial markets and intermediaries began to develop new 
ways to deal with unpredictable market fluctuations, some of which ultimately led to even further financial 
fragility.  However, while the advent of IT technology and a new international economic climate may help 
to explain the increased occurrence of type E and F innovations, it does not at all address the question of 
the causes of the actual decrease in beneficial innovations.   
 Why should financial innovations that are beneficial to the real economy be less prone to appear in 
one technology shift versus another? This is a difficult, yet very important question to consider.  Other than 
the development of a new GPT and the breakdown of the old international economic regime, the other 
major structural difference between the most recent technological paradigm and the previous one is a 
profound reversal of national sentiment towards governmental regulation.  The suggestion here is not that 
deregulation puts a stop to the occurrence of financial innovations useful to the real economy while 
regulation creates them, but that generally speaking, those in the financial sphere may tend to interpret one 
of the most fundamental concepts of finance - ‘risk pooling’ - differently under regulatory versus de-
regulatory regimes respectively.  To that end, while much has been made about what Kane (1986) describes 
as the ‘regulatory dialectic’ – that is, the response from the financial industry to the introduction of new 
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governmental policy or regulations - little attention has been paid to the effect on the financial sector of 
what could be called the ‘regulatory pendulum’.  
IV. 
Coffee and Cigars 
The phrase ‘regulatory pendulum’ is useful in both a narrow and expansive sense.  Used narrowly, 
it refers to swings over time from one extreme to the other with regard to the predisposition of government 
towards either regulation or non-regulation.  Conversely, it is used expansively to refer to same movement 
but with respect towards the perennial change in spirit of not just the government, but the entire nation - 
between what is best described as a laissez-faire, or pro-business mentality on the one hand, and an 
economically interventionist, or populist, one on the other29.   
This national change in spirit is easily observed throughout the country’s history – for example, the 
‘Gilded age’ of the late nineteenth century was followed by the ‘Progressive era’ of the very early 
twentieth, only to be replaced again with the laissez-faire attitudes of the 1920s, which in turn were shed 
due to the Great Depression.  The mid to late twentieth century manifestation of this pendulum swing is 
found within the fall from grace of the Keynesians and the corresponding rise to dominance of the 
Monetarists.   However, these days it is beginning to appear as if the sun in the Monetarist horizon lays low 
in the sky, thus many are predicting the return of an economically activist federal government once again.  
To be clear, the contention here is not that in the absence of an economically activist government beneficial 
innovations are not created, but that during these times the focus of the financial sphere tends to contract – 
returning to work under an assumed munificent ‘invisible hand’ rather than the oversight of their peers, and 
subsequently focusing less on the social outcomes generated by their activities, and a whole lot more on the 
‘utility’ derived from increased pecuniary gain.  Thus the composition changes between those whose 
economic risks are pooled and those facing exposure – potentially working to the disadvantage of other 
actors in the economy, including both the ‘real’ economy as well as an increased portion of the body 
politic30.  Deregulation does not necessarily stifle beneficial financial innovations, but the results of this 
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 The author is aware that the terms laissez-faire and pro-business, and interventionist and populist are not necessarily always 
equivalents to one another.  Indeed, pro-business and interventionism have often gone hand in hand under the guise of both 
‘protectionism’ and ‘economic imperialism’.  However, the change in national sentiment that is being described here is an 
attempt to capture opposing ends of the domestic spectrum of interests specifically – and in such a context the respective 
associations of the terms are considered appropriate. 
30
 Indeed, it is a possibility that during these times finance becomes less about risk pooling and more about risk passing.   
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research indicate that unfettered deregulation does appear to have at least some connection with the 
rerouting of financial capital efforts towards less useful purposes. 
However, this suggestion must be taken in hand with Perez’s (2002, p. 164) rejoinder that the 
objectives of monetary and fiscal policy are themselves not static but ‘moving targets’, and that “at each 
turn, the range for creativity in terms of viable responses [is] shaped by the nature of each successive 
technological revolution and its paradigm, as well as by the character of each phase of its unfolding”.  That 
is to say, that rather than stubbornly clinging to ideological preferences about the role of the state in the 
economy from either extreme of the pendulum, the rules can and should be changed according to both the 
needs and demands of each new technology shift.  It is also very much for the best if the unique dynamics 
contained within the rationalization and transformation phases are taken into consideration when forming 
policies as well.  
Moreover, it is only logical that industries appearing early on as highly sensitive to the development 
of a new GPT – as was the case with the financial sector and the microprocessor - are also naturally 
deserving of both increased ministrations as well as monitoring.  After all, while it is indeed true that ‘it is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner’, there is 
nevertheless at least one other essential element that must be present in order for self-interest to succeed as 
a sustainable mechanism of innovation, growth and exchange – and that is the element of trust31.  If we do 
not trust the butcher, the brewer or the baker to provide us with un-tainted victuals, then we will either seek 
our supper elsewhere, or go and make it ourselves.  With that in mind while returning to take a look at the 
final tally of six financial innovations working for the good of the real economy and twenty one working 
towards a very much more dubious goal – it seems as if financial innovation may not just be another word 
for excessive and reckless leverage, as Ritholz the pundit would have it, but the American public certainly 
does appear to be justified with regard towards our collective loss of trust in the primary objectives of its 
creators. 
Nevertheless, it is important here to recall another of the oldest lessons Adam Smith (1759) imparts 
to us:  in a book written nearly twenty years prior to teaching the world about the ‘nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations’ he reminds us that best off are those who are ‘mutually sympathetic’ to one another.  
Likewise, Schumpeter (1939), Perez (2002, 2007), Schön (1989, 1998) and others’ insight that that the 
blame for many moments of economic crisis throughout our history (and yet to come) falls not on the 
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 Which Adam Smith paid homage to in his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  
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shoulders of discrete agents, but on changing structural conditions that are a part of every dynamic 
capitalist economy should also be borne in mind.  Ultimately, both the aim of this paper – as well as the 
entire state of the economy (in the humble opinion of this researcher) - must be viewed through the lens of 
these combined instructions.  The goal is not the vilification of financial innovations, or the people and 
institutions that create them.  The priority is rather an attempt to uncover underlying mechanisms that give 
rise to their changing proclivities.  With that said however, at least one element of the evidence brought 
forth very clearly speaks for itself. Twenty one fragility imbuing innovations out of fifty three is not a good 
track record – nor is it a helpful recommendation towards the idea that there exists a virtuous invisible 
hand.   
In the final analysis, the results of this research tentatively indicate that there may indeed be a 
broadly consistent rhythm as to when in the long cycle our collective trust in financial innovation may be 
the most misplaced – or complementarily, when our guidance may be the most needed.  However, 
discrepancies between qualitatively and quantitatively derived timelines and oblique differences in the 
results obtained by the two respective models obliges one to come to the conclusion that much further 
research is required before any concrete conclusions can be reached32.   
. 
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 Curiously, the observations contained within the first technology shift under analysis fit this researcher’s expectations almost 
perfectly (tables 4 and 5), whereas the same is true with regard towards the second shift and Perez’s expectations (table 7).  
This is most likely coincidental – however further research may reveal a tentative explanation or even a causal connection.  
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